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Shifting Traction: Differential Treatment and Substantive and Procedural Regard in the 
International Climate Change Regime 
Anna Huggins* and Md Saiful Karim** 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Whilst the meaning of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) in the 
international climate change regime was relatively clear-cut under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)1 and its Kyoto Protocol,2 its significance 
under the Paris Agreement3 to the UNFCCC is more nuanced, flexible and inchoate. According 
to the CBDR principle, all states have common environmental responsibilities,4 but the manner 
in which each state meets its responsibilities should vary according to country-specific 
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1 New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: 
http://unfccc.int, at Art. 1. The UNFCCC enjoins parties ‘to protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capacities’: ibid., at Art. 3(1). 
2 Kyoto (Japan), 11 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
3 See Draft Decision -/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Report of the Conference of the Parties (COP) on its 
Twenty-first Session, held in Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 
12 Dec. 2015, Annex, available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf. 
4 This is consistent with the principle of pacta sunt servanda enshrined in Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna (Austria), 23 May 1969, in force 27 Jan. 1980, available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf. This was 
confirmed in the 2011 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, in which the Seabed Dispute Chamber acknowledged the 
provisions promoting preferential treatment for developing states, yet noted that a sponsoring state’s responsibilities 
and liabilities ‘apply equally to all sponsoring States, whether developing or developed’: International Tribunal of 
the Law of the Sea, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to 
Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion), Seabed Disputes Chamber, Case No. 17, 1 Feb. 2011, para. 158. 
 
 
economic, historical, social and ecological variables.5 Whereas the UNFCCC and its Kyoto 
Protocol codified this principle in the form of differential treatment in their central treaty 
obligations, including those pertaining to mitigation,6 the Paris Agreement replaces top-down 
differentiation with respect to mitigation obligations with a new paradigm of bottom-up ‘self-
differentiation’,7 as parties select their own mitigation targets.8 Despite the diminished role for 
the CBDR principle in relation to prescriptive, substantive mitigation commitments under the 
Paris Agreement, this article posits that there is increasing scope for the CBDR principle to shape 
procedurally-oriented implementation and support mechanisms under the Paris Agreement. In 
particular, CBDR will continue to play a pivotal role in the context of adaptation, finance and 
technology transfer, capacity building and compliance. However, the increasingly salient 
avenues for procedural differentiation will need to be buttressed by robust accountability 
mechanisms, including consequences for deficient performance,9 to be effective. Currently, such 
accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped in this nascent phase of the Paris Agreement. 
 
Insights from global administrative law (GAL) scholarship10 valuably inform this analysis. GAL 
scholarship highlights the desirability of global administrative action being circumscribed by 
                                                      
5 D. Hunter, J. Salzman & D. Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy, 4th edn (Foundation Press, 
2011), p. 464. 
6 Art. 4(2) UNFCCC, n. 1 above, and Art. 3 Kyoto Protocol, n. 2 above. 
7 L. Rajamani, ‘The Devilish Details: Key Legal Issues in the 2015 Climate Negotiations’ (2015) 78(5) Modern Law 
Review, pp. 826-53, at 852. 
8 J. Brunnee & C. Streck, ‘The UNFCCC as a Negotiation Forum: Towards Common but More Differentiated 
Responsibilities’ (2013) 13(5) Climate Policy, pp. 589-607, at 591. 
9 R.B. Stewart, ‘Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation, and 
Responsiveness’ (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law, pp. 211-70, at 253.  
10 GAL can be defined as ‘comprising the mechanisms, principles and practices, and supporting social 
understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by 
ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by 
providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make’: B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch & R.B. Stewart, ‘The 
Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 15-61, at 17. See also 
N. Krisch & B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International 
Legal Order’ (2006) 17(1) The European Journal of International Law, pp. 1-13, and the other articles in this 
Symposium issue of the European Journal of International Law, at pp. 1-278.  
 
 
mechanisms for accountability, transparency, participation, reason giving and review.11 Stewart 
extends this argument by positing that ‘procedural regard’ for the interests of weaker actors can 
be promoted by these principles and practices.12 Procedural regard is facilitated by an 
administrative framework in which relevant decision makers take into account affected actors’ 
interests in decision-making processes13 – in this case, developing countries’ interests and needs 
with respect to treaty implementation. In contrast, substantive regard implies securing certain 
outcomes that are favourable to developing countries.14 Building on this distinction, this article 
contends that the diminished influence of the CBDR principle in terms of substantive regard, 
which is typically guaranteed through top-down differentiation in central treaty obligations, is 
counterbalanced by an increasing – if as yet underdeveloped – scope for the CBDR principle to 
foster procedural regard for developing countries’ interests under the Paris Agreement.  In this 
context, the experience of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) procedurally-
differentiated regime for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from marine bunker fuels 
yields valuable lessons. The IMO’s approach has proved ineffective in promoting developing 
countries’ interests, largely because it does not incorporate adequate accountability mechanisms. 
Such mechanisms are necessary to transform mere procedural opportunities for differentiation 
into a robust framework for procedural regard. 
 
This article proceeds as follows. Part 2 provides a conceptual framework for substantive and 
procedural regard, and charts the demise of CBDR as a principle that prescriptively shapes 
substantive mitigation obligations in the international climate change regime. Part 3 analyzes the 
                                                      
11 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, n. 10 above, p. 28. 
12 Stewart argues that regard can be enhanced by, inter alia, accountability and other ‘responsiveness-promoting 
measures’ such as transparency, non-decisional participation and reason giving: Stewart, n. 9 above, pp. 233, 266. 
13 Ibid., p. 224. 
14 Ibid.  
 
 
text of the Paris Agreement and identifies the ways in which it paves the way for a more 
proceduralized manifestation of the CBDR principle. Part 4 explores the similar trajectory of the 
CBDR principle in the IMO’s climate change mitigation regime, and draws lessons from this 
comparison. Concluding remarks are offered in Part 5. 
 
2.  SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL REGARD IN THE UNFCCC AND ITS 
KYOTO PROTOCOL 
The reconceptualization of the role of the CBDR principle in terms of substantive and procedural 
regard illustrates the value of insights from GAL as ‘essential’ components15 of the developing 
field of transnational environmental law. GAL is an innovative branch of legal scholarship that 
argues that much of contemporary global governance can be conceptualized and analyzed as 
global administrative action.16 GAL highlights the importance of new administrative law 
mechanisms in global regulatory governance,17 in particular principles and practices that promote 
accountability, transparency, participation, reasoned decision making and review.18 This article 
contends that these administrative mechanisms have a significant potential to promote procedural 
regard for developing states’ interests under the Paris Agreement. However, their efficacy could 
be undermined by partial and uneven adoption.   
 
According to Stewart, there is a ‘problem of disregard’ with respect to the interests of less 
powerful states and other marginalized actors in global regulatory bodies.19 The problem of 
                                                      
15 P.H. Sand, ‘The Evolution of Transnational Environmental Law: Four Cases in Historical Perspective’ (2012) 
1(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 183-98, at 185.  
16 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, n. 10 above, p. 17. 
17 The other primary strand of inquiry concerns attempts by domestic administrative systems to constrain 
intergovernmental regulatory decisions that have national implications: ibid., pp. 16, 18. 
18 Ibid., p. 28. 
19 For an overview, see Stewart, n. 9 above. 
 
 
disregard describes the strong risk of bias in global regulatory regimes towards promoting the 
interests of the powerful and well resourced, whilst overlooking the interests and concerns of 
weaker groups and individuals.20 Stewart proposes that administrative mechanisms have 
significant potential to redress this risk by being responsive to affected stakeholders’ interests.21 
He explains how regard can provide an antidote to the problem of disregard as follows: 
 
As an ideal, regard requires that the decision-maker review available information about the effects 
of proposed decisions on the various groups, individuals, interests, and concerns entitled to 
consideration; weighs the benefits for and burdens on them of alternatives; and determines that 
decisions that impose disadvantage or harm on some affected groups and individuals are justified 
by relevant decisional norms.22 
 
This type of procedural regard can be contrasted with both procedural disregard, in which 
decision makers fail or refuse to have regard for affected actors’ interests,23 and substantive 
regard, which implies outcomes that are favourable to weaker or vulnerable actors.24 This latter 
distinction is central to the argument in this article, although it is acknowledged that in practice 
substantive regard can reinforce procedural regard, and vice versa.25  
 
                                                      
20 Ibid., p. 211.  
21 Ibid., pp. 244-68. Cf. the critiques of the GAL project arguing that the adoption of administrative procedures in 
global regulatory bodies may serve to entrench the dominance of the powerful and well-resourced: see, e.g., B.S. 
Chimni, ‘Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 37 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics, pp. 799-827, at 826; B.S. Chimni, ‘Global Administrative Law: Winners 
and Losers’, paper presented at the NYU Law School Global Administrative Law Conference, 22-23 Apr. 2005, p. 
11, available at: http://www.iilj.org/gal/documents/ChimniPaper.pdf; C. Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The 
Quest for Principles and Values’ (2006) 17(1) The European Journal of International Law, pp. 187-214, at 187; C. 
Harlow, ‘Accountability as a Value for Global Governance and Global Administrative Law’, in G. Anthony, J.-B. 
Auby, J. Morison & T. Zwart (eds), Values in Global Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 207-14. 
However, there is little evidence of administrative mechanisms being co-opted by powerful states in the compliance 
systems of three major global multilateral environmental agreements: A. Huggins, ‘The Desirability of 
Administrative Proceduralisation: Compliance Rules and Decisions in Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ 
(Ph.D. thesis, University of New South Wales (Australia), Oct. 2015). 
22 Stewart, n. 9 above, pp. 224-5.  
23 Ibid., p. 224.  
24 Ibid.  
25 See, e.g., N. Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment: Process, Substance and 
Integration (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 273-4. 
 
 
There are a number of administrative mechanisms that can enhance procedural regard, only some 
of which are thus far evident in the Paris Agreement.26 Stewart groups regard-enhancing tools 
into three categories: ‘decision rules’, ‘accountability mechanisms’, and ‘other responsiveness-
promoting measures’.27 Decision rules govern which actors have the authority to vote or are 
otherwise vested with authoritative power in the decision-making process.28 Other-
responsiveness promoting measures include, inter alia, measures for transparency, non-decisional 
participation and reason giving, which can be buttressed by review.29 The regard-enhancing tool 
which is most pertinent to the argument in this article is accountability. Stewart favours a narrow 
definition of accountability, characterized by three structural elements:  
 
(1) a specified accounter, who is subject to being called to provide account for his conduct; (2) a 
specified account holder who can require the accounter to render account; and (3) the ability and 
authority of the account holder to impose sanctions or other remedies for deficient performance.30 
 
This definition sees accountability as a discrete procedural tool, and can be contrasted with 
broader understandings which conceive of accountability as a conceptual umbrella.31 The narrow 
approach to accountability, which is adopted in this article, can apply to states acting as 
administrative ‘agents’ responsible for implementing their commitments under the international 
climate change regime that are ultimately accountable to the state parties for compliance with 
                                                      
 
27 Stewart, n. 9 above, p. 233. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid., p. 266. 
30 Ibid., p. 253. 
31 See, e.g., R.W. Grant & R.O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’ (2005) 99(1) 
American Political Science Review, pp. 29-43, at 36 (identifying hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, peer 
reputational, and public reputational accountability mechanisms); and J.L. Mashaw, ‘Structuring a “Dense 
Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law’ (2005) 5(1) Issues in Legal Scholarship, pp. 1-
38, at 27 (identifying political, administrative, legal, product market, labor market, financial market, family, 
professional, and team accountability).  
 
 
their treaty obligations.32 It is argued that the development of accountability mechanisms for 
states with respect to their mitigation and support commitments is vital to the success of the 
emerging framework for procedural regard under the Paris Agreement, but is at risk of being 
undermined by a paucity of remedies for deficient performance.33  
 
Stewart’s discussion of disregard for marginalized individuals and groups explicitly excludes the 
potential for global regulatory bodies to ‘disregard the interests and concerns of weaker states, 
especially developing-country states’.34 This article expands upon Stewart’s analysis by 
contending that, in the international climate change regime, the CBDR principle has the potential 
to shape both substantive and procedural regard for developing states’ interests. The potential for 
procedural regard is most clearly evident in the Paris Agreement. Of course, developing states’ 
interests and capacities in the international climate change regime are not homogenous; the 
interests of vulnerable least developed countries and small island countries diverge significantly 
from large developing economies like China, India and Brazil, and from comparatively wealthy 
developing countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and South Korea.35 Thus, when 
this article refers to developing states’ interests in relation to procedural regard, the focus is on 
                                                      
32 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, n. 10 above, p. 36. See also J. Waldron, ‘The Rule of International Law’ (2006) 30 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, pp. 15-30, at 23; J. Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of 
the International Rule of Law?’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law, pp. 315-43, at 327-37. 
33 See the third point in Stewart’s definition of accountability in n. 30 above.  
34 Stewart, n. 9 above, p. 220. 
35 D. Bodansky & L. Rajamani, ‘Evolution and Governance Architecture of the Climate Change Regime’, in D. 
Sprinz & U. Luterbacher (eds), International Relations and Global Climate Change: New Perspectives, 2nd edn (The 
MIT Press, 2016 Forthcoming). Indeed, it is claimed that the lines between the global North and South in the 
international climate change regime have ‘become increasingly blurred, as nations have formed various blocs and 
alliances and several Southern countries have become major emitters’: R. Maguire & X. Jiang, ‘Emerging Powerful 
Southern Voices: Role of BASIC Nations in Shaping Climate Change Mitigation Commitments’, in S. Alam, S. 
Atapattu, C.G. Gonzalez & J. Razzaque, International Environmental Law and the Global South (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), pp. 214-36, at 236; J. Pauwelyn, ‘The End of Differential Treatment for Developing 
Countries? Lessons from the Trade and Climate Change Regimes’ (2013) 22(1) Review of European Community & 
International Environmental Law, pp. 29-41. Nonetheless, as is discussed in Part 3 below, the division between 
developing and developed countries is still a salient factor in negotiating the architecture of the Paris Agreement. 
 
 
those developing states that face genuine capacity constraints with respect to implementing their 
substantive obligations, albeit to varying degrees. These capacity constraints reflect ongoing 
economic and political disparities between developed and developing states that have origins in 
colonialism.36 As Chayes and Handler Chayes note, developing countries’ implementation and 
compliance issues are generally attributable to ‘a severe dearth of the requisite scientific, 
technical, bureaucratic, and financial wherewithal to build effective domestic enforcement 
systems’.37 The present analysis of procedural regard focuses on decision making that relates to 
the genuine capacity limitations of developing states. 
 
Understanding differentiation in international environmental agreements in terms of its potential 
for fostering procedural and substantive regard creates an alternative categorization of 
differential treatment to those deployed in earlier writings. Rajamani, for example, outlines three 
primary ways to categorize differential treatment in IEL: 
 
 Provisions that differentiate between industrial and developing countries with respect to the 
central obligations contained in the treaty, such as emissions reduction targets; 
 Provisions that differentiate between industrial and developing countries with respect to 
implementation, such as delayed compliance schedules, permission to adopt subsequent base 
years, delayed reporting schedules, and soft approaches to non-compliance; and  
 Provisions that grant assistance, inter alia, financial and technological.38 
                                                      
36 See generally A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
37 A. Chayes & A. Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 
(Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 14. 
38 L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 93. 
For a similar yet alternative categorization, see Cullet’s analysis of the ways in which differentiation manifests in 
IEL. Cullet asserts that: ‘The first type of differentiation refers to situations where treaties provide different 
obligations for different groups of states. Secondly, differential treatment also takes the form of measures to 
facilitate implementation in states which do not have capacity to implement specific commitments. … Thirdly, while 
differential treatment is primary a concept applying to inter-state relations, it is also relevant to the issue of 
broadening of the range of actors in international law and the role of non-state actors in addressing problems like 
climate change’: P. Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Ashgate Publishing, 2003), 
p. 28. Maguire argues that ‘the principle of CBDR is implemented in more of a true sense under the implementation 
model of differentiation, as this is an instance in which all nations play a role in implementing the agreement and as 
 
 
 
This article extends and complements Rajamani’s categorization by analyzing the changing 
prominence of these categories in terms of the shifting traction of opportunities for substantive 
and procedural regard in the Paris Agreement.39  
 
In tracing this shifting trajectory, it is logical to begin with an evaluation of substantive and 
procedural regard in the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Against the backdrop of the North-
South divide,40 and reflecting the growing prominence of the CBDR principle prior to and after 
the Rio Earth Summit in 1992,41 differential treatment for developing countries is enshrined in 
the central treaty obligations of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, which is unique amongst 
global multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).42 In the 1992 UNFCCC, all parties have 
procedural obligations to publish national emissions inventories, and to formulate, publish and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
such creates “common” responsibilities for all states’: R. Maguire, ‘The Role of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities in the 2020 Climate Regime’ (2013) 7(4) Carbon and Climate Law Review, pp. 260-9, at 261. 
39 Such a shift may be seen as part of a broader trend towards proceduralization in international law and global 
governance: see, e.g., M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 148-57; N. Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact 
Assessment: Process, Substance and Integration (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 271-4. 
40 North-South political dynamics in this regime occur against a complex background characterized by the 
industrialized North’s primary responsibility for historical emissions, national variations in historical and 
contemporary wealth and emissions use, and the disproportionate vulnerability of the poorest populations within 
developing countries to adverse climate change impacts: L. Rajamani, J. Brunnee & M. Doelle, ‘Introduction: The 
Role of Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime’, in J. Brunnee, M. Doelle & L. Rajamani (eds), Promoting 
Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1-14, at 1-2. 
41 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration enshrines the CBDR principle: ‘States shall cooperate in a spirit of global 
partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different 
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The 
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable 
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and 
financial resources they command’: United Nations General Assembly, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (Annex I), A/CONF.151/26 (vol 1), 14 Jun. 1992,  
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1.htm, principle 7. Rajamani argues that the influence of the 
CBDR principle in international environmental law reached its zenith in the decade between the Rio Earth Summit 
in 1992 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002: L. Rajamani, ‘The Changing Fortunes of 
Differential Treatment in the Evolution of International Environmental Law’ (2012) 88(3) International Affairs, pp. 
605-23, at 606. 
42 Brunnee, Doelle & Rajamani, n. 40 above, p. 3.  
 
 
regularly update national and regional programmes containing mitigation measures.43 However, 
only Annex I industrialized countries44 are required to adopt national mitigation policies to limit 
GHG emissions and protect and enhance sinks and reservoirs, with the aim of reducing overall 
GHG emissions to 1990 levels.45 Thus, the primary mitigation burden under the UNFCCC falls 
upon industrialized countries. Accordingly, this convention evidences obligations that are 
favourable to developing states and hence reflect substantive regard. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the third Conference of the Parties (COP) in 1997 to 
strengthen the relatively broad and vague commitments in the original Framework Convention. 
The Kyoto Protocol mirrors the UNFCCC’s asymmetric approach to developed and developing 
state parties. The Protocol committed industrialized countries to achieve differentiated, legally-
binding overall emissions targets of at least 5% below 1990 levels in the first commitment period 
from 2008 – 2012. In contrast, developing countries were only required to meet certain 
procedural obligations, such as reporting. The Kyoto Protocol thus perpetuated and further 
entrenched the UNFCCC’s substantive regard for the interests of developing states. Indeed, as 
Rajamani notes, the Kyoto Protocol represents ‘the high-water mark of differential treatment’ in 
international environmental law.46  
 
The starkly differentiated substantive mitigation obligations in the Kyoto Protocol are 
complemented by a well-developed framework for procedural regard which allows developing 
states’ interests to be factored into decision-making processes within the regime. For example, 
                                                      
43 Art. 4(1)(a), (b) UNFCCC, n. 1 above. 
44 That is, developed countries and countries in transition.  
45 Art. 4(2)(a) and (b) UNFCCC, n. 1 above. 
46 Rajamani, n. 41 above, p. 606.  
 
 
the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance Committee was established as the body responsible for 
resolving compliance issues and determining the consequences of non-compliance.47 The 
Committee comprises two branches – the Enforcement Branch and the Facilitative Branch – 
which reflects a unique dual focus on enforcing and promoting compliance.48 The Enforcement 
Branch has a mandate to take relatively strong measures49 in response to questions of 
implementation involving industrialized country parties’ emissions reductions commitments and 
related reporting and eligibility requirements ‘taking into account the cause, type, degree and 
frequency of the non-compliance of that Party’.50 In contrast, the Facilitative Branch is tasked 
with advising and facilitating implementation for all parties,51 taking into account the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities’.52 Only the Facilitative 
Branch of the Compliance Committee was intended to apply to developing countries.53 The 
Facilitative Branch has had limited practical relevance for all countries to date.54  
 
                                                      
47 Decision 27/CMP.1, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3Annex, 30 Mar. 2006, at section II. 
48 S. Oberthur & R. Lefeber, ‘Holding Countries to Account: The Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System Revisited 
after Four Years of Experience’ (2010) 1 Climate Law, pp. 133-58, at 134.  
49 As discussed further below, the consequences of a finding of non-compliance available to the Enforcement 
Branch include states’ suspension from participating in the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms if the non-compliance 
issue concerns the eligibility requirements, and deductions from future emissions allocations if a Party’s emission 
target is exceeded: Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 46 above, at section XV, at paras. 5(b) and (c). 
50 Ibid., at section XV, para. 1. 
51 Stated differently, the mandate of the Facilitative Branch is to address questions of implementation that are not 
within the purview of the Enforcement Branch: G. Ulfstein & J. Werksman, ‘The Kyoto Compliance System: 
Towards Hard Enforcement’, in O.S. Stokke, J. Hovi & G. Ulfstein (eds), Implementing the Climate Regime: 
International Compliance (Earthscan, 2005), pp. 39-62, at 45. 
52 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 47 above, at section IV, para. 4. 
53 As Rajamani notes, ‘This is evident from the provisions relating to the mandate of the enforcement branch which 
cover Annex I commitments alone (i.e. compliance with Articles 3.1, 5.1 and 5.2, 7.1, and 7.4, and eligibility 
requirements under Articles 6, 12, and 17)’: L. Rajamani, ‘Developing Countries and Compliance in the Climate 
Regime’, in Brunnee, Doelle & Rajamani (eds), n. 40 above, p. 391.  
54 Oberthur & Lefeber, n. 48 above, p. 155. The Facilitative Branch has limited practical impact because most 
developing country obligations are currently reflected in the UNFCCC, rather than the Kyoto Protocol. See 
Rajamani, n. 53 above, p. 388. There are of course clear differences in financial and technical capacity, and 
bargaining power, even amongst Annex I countries, with many countries with economies in transition facing 
significant capacity constraints compared to their developed country counterparts. 
 
 
Significantly, both the Enforcement and Facilitative Branches represent decision-making forums 
that are constrained by extensive due process guarantees.55 Once a non-compliance issue has 
been referred to either branch, the rights afforded to the relevant party include:56  
 making information available to the party concerned and requiring notifications to be sent 
to the party at the different stages of the process;57  
 allowing the party the opportunity to comment in writing on all information considered 
by the relevant branch, as well as on any decisions;58  
 permitting the party to designate persons to represent it during the consideration of the 
question of implementation by the relevant branch;59  
 allowing written submissions, including rebuttal, from the party;60 and  
 providing the party with a hearing, to be held in public unless otherwise decided, where it 
may present its views, and expert testimony or opinion.61  
 
Compared to other MEA compliance systems, this represents an extensive range of procedural 
safeguards for parties called to account for their performance under the Kyoto Protocol.62  
                                                      
55 This point is informed by the work of Dubash and Morgan, who propose that the general concept of a 
‘procedurally constrained space for political negotiation’ is a ‘core and inevitable dimension’ of domestic 
regulatory governance in the global South: N. Dubash & B. Morgan, ‘The Embedded Regulatory State: Between 
Rules and Deals’, in N. Dubash & B. Morgan, The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South: Infrastructure and 
Development in Emerging Economies (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 279-95, at 289 (emphasis in original). 
56 This list is adapted from the list of procedural requirements in: UNFCCC Secretariat, Procedural Requirements 
and the Scope and Content of Applicable Law for the Consideration of Appeals under Decision 27/CMP.1 and Other 
Relevant Decisions of the COP Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the Approach 
Taken by other Relevant International Bodies Relating to Denial of Due Process, Technical Paper, 
FCCC/TP/2011/6, 15 Sept. 2011, at p. 7. 
57 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 47 above, annex, at section VII, paras. 4 and 5; section VIII, para. 7; and section IX, para. 
6. 
58 Ibid., annex, at section VII, para. 7; and section VIII, paras. 6 and 8; and Decision 4/CMP.2, Compliance 
Committee, FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10/Add.1, 4 Mar. 2007, at rules 17 and 18. 
59 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 47 above, annex, at section VIII, para. 2; and Decision 4/CMP.2, n. 58 above, at rule 
25(3). 
60 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 47 above, annex, at section IX, paras. 1 and 7; and Decision 4/CMP.2, n. 58 above, at rule 
17. 
61 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 47 above, annex, at section IX, para. 2; and Decision 4/CMP.2, n. 58 above, at rule 9(1). 
 
 
 
The due process guarantees in the Facilitative and Enforcement Branches are consonant with 
procedural regard in a number of ways. Firstly, these forums promote accountability by requiring 
states to account for their compliance with their multilateral environmental commitments, and 
for consequences to be considered and imposed in the event of non-compliance.63 In the 
Facilitative Branch, such consequences are relatively ‘soft’ and include the provision of advice 
regarding implementation, financial and technical assistance, and the formulation of 
recommendations.64 The remedies available to the Enforcement Branch are significantly more 
intrusive and include the requirement of a ‘compliance action plan’ for remedying non-
compliance with methodological and reporting requirements,65 states’ suspension from 
participating in the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms66 if the non-compliance issue concerns the 
eligibility requirements,67 and deductions from future emissions allocations if a party’s emissions 
target is exceeded.68 Thus, the accountability requirements of a forum in which states are 
answerable for their conduct, with potential remedies for deficient performance, are satisfied.69 
Secondly, such guarantees promote participation by and dialogue with70 affected parties, and the 
transparency of the compliance process. These measures correspond with the non-decisional 
                                                                                                                                                                              
62 On the relative strength of the Kyoto compliance system’s due process guarantees compared to other global 
MEAs, see, e.g., M. Montini, ‘Procedural Guarantees in Non-Compliance Mechanisms’, in T. Treves et al. (eds), 
Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements 
(T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009), pp. 389-405. 
63 This aligns with a narrow understanding of accountability as discussed in Part 2 above: see Stewart, n. 30 above. 
64 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 47 above, at section XIV. 
65 Ibid., at section XV, para. 5(b). 
66 Joint implementation, the clean development mechanism, and emissions trading: see Kyoto Protocol, n. 2 above, 
Arts. 6, 12 and 17, respectively. 
67 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 47 above, at section XV, para. 5(c). 
68 Specifically, a ‘deduction from the Party’s assigned amount for the second commitment period of a number of 
tonnes equal to 1.3 times the amount in tonnes of excess emissions’: ibid., at section XV, para. 5(a). 
69 Stewart, n. 30 above. 
70 Hovell argues that the ‘essence of due process is not to provide access to a court, but to provide access to 
“dialogue”’: D. Hovell, The Power of Process: The Value of Due Process in Security Council Sanctions Decision-
Making (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 5.  
 
 
participation and transparency measures Stewart categorizes under ‘other responsiveness-
promoting measures’.71 Thirdly, a party can appeal to the COP serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties against a decision of the Enforcement Branch if it believes it has been denied due process 
and the decision ‘relates to’ Article 3(1) of the Kyoto Protocol regarding national emissions 
targets,72 providing a limited avenue for review. Thus, both branches of the Compliance 
Committee provide forums for holding states to account for their commitments that are 
constrained by numerous administrative mechanisms, evidencing procedural regard.73 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the Kyoto Protocol’s innovations in terms of differentiation in 
central mitigation obligations and the creation of procedurally-constrained Enforcement and 
Facilitative Branches in the Compliance Committee, little of the Kyoto Protocol’s architecture is 
evident in the Paris Agreement.74 These changes are at least in part attributable to ongoing 
debates and contestation about the appropriate role for the CBDR principle in the international 
climate change regime.75 For developing and developed countries alike, achieving deep GHG 
emissions cuts poses financial, regulatory and technical capacity challenges,76 and key players 
such as the United States (US) have continued to resist accepting binding mitigation 
commitments unless developing countries ‘meaningfully participate[]’ in climate mitigation 
                                                      
71 Stewart, n. 9 above, p. 233. 
72 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 47 above, at section XI, para. 1.  
73 Lefeber and Oberthur argue that the Kyoto compliance system ‘provides for an unprecedented administrative 
review, by an independent international body, of state action to implement the Protocol’: Lefeber & Oberthur, n. 48 
above, p. 134.  
74 Rajamani, n. 7 above, at p. 844.  
75 J. Brunnee, ‘Promoting Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, in Brunnee, Doelle & 
Rajamani (eds), n. 40 above, pp. 48-9; Rajamani, ‘Developing Countries and Compliance in the Climate Regime’, n. 
53 above, p. 367.  
76 Brunnee, n. 75 above, p. 48. 
 
 
efforts.77 This is perhaps unsurprising given that large developing countries such as Brazil, China 
and India rank among the world’s top ten contributors to cumulative global emissions.78 Against 
this backdrop, there was diminishing support amongst some states for the Kyoto Protocol and its 
top-down ‘prescriptive, quantitative, time-bound, compliance-backed approach’ to mitigation for 
industrialized countries only.79 The Kyoto Protocol’s demise coincided with a renewed 
enthusiasm for forging a new agreement under the UNFCCC that would have universal coverage 
and prioritize decentralized, bottom-up selection of national mitigation targets and actions, 
reinforced by rigorous reporting frameworks.80 This paradigm shift is reflected in the Paris 
Agreement, which is premised on nationally-determined contributions (NDCs), rather than 
centrally imposed targets that differentiate between developed and developing state parties.  
 
3.  PROCEDURALLY-ORIENTED DIFFERENTIATION IN THE PARIS AGREEMENT  
An analysis of the Paris Agreement shows a relative dearth of provisions that guarantee 
substantive regard for developing states’ mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage interests. 
However, a variety of provisions lays the foundation for a framework for procedural regard to 
support developing states’ implementation of their substantive commitments. Yet this 
procedurally-oriented differentiation risks being ultimately unsuccessful in achieving common 
mitigation and adaptation goals if it is not supported by finance, technology transfer and 
                                                      
77 D. Abreu Mejia, ‘The Evolution of the Climate Change Regime: Beyond a North-South Divide?’ (Working Paper 
2010/06 Institute Catala Internacional per la, June 2010), p. 23, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884192. 
78 Rajamani, Brunnee & Doelle, n. 40 above, at p. 4. At Copenhagen, a new bloc comprising the large developing 
countries of Brazil, South Africa, India and China, known as BASIC, emerged as a powerful geopolitical force: N. 
K. Dubash & L. Rajamani, ‘Beyond Copenhagen: Next Steps’ (2010) 10 Climate Policy, pp. 593-9, at 594. 
79 Rajamani, Brunnee & Doelle, n. 40 above, p. 7. 
80 L. Rajamani, ‘The Cancun Climate Agreement: Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves’ (2011) 60(2) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 499-519; A. Huggins, ‘The Desirability of Depoliticization: 
Compliance in the International Climate Regime’ (2015) 4(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 101-24, at 121.   
 
 
capacity-building commitments from developed states that are robust, quantifiable, and for 
which they will be held to account.  
 
The binary distinction between developed and developing countries’ mitigation obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol has not been replicated under the Paris Agreement. Whilst developing state 
parties did not have legally binding emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris 
Agreement imposes a collective general obligation on all state parties to hold ‘the increase in the 
global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to 
limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.81 This commitment is to be 
achieved through successive and progressively strengthened NDCs of state parties.82 In this 
context, developed countries should continue to take the lead through economy-wide absolute 
emissions reduction targets.83 Developing countries should also make mitigation efforts and are 
encouraged to adopt economy-wide emissions reduction targets in the future in the light of 
national circumstances.84 States’ obligations are binding with respect to fulfilling procedural 
requirements to prepare, communicate, maintain and periodically report national contributions, 
and pursue domestic mitigation measures,85 rather than in relation to the substantive achievement 
of mitigation targets.86 Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s rigid, top-down bifurcation between the 
mitigation targets of industrialized and developing countries has been replaced by bottom-up 
                                                      
81 Art. 2 Paris Agreement, n. 3 above. 
82 Art. 4, ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Art. 4(4), ibid. The Agreement clearly specifies that this target should be achieved in the context of sustainable 
development, poverty eradication, equity, the CBDR principle, support provided to developing and least developed 
countries and the special circumstances of the least developed and small island countries: ibid., at Arts. 2, 3 and 4, 
and preamble. 
85 Ibid., at Art. 4(2) and 4(3). Under Art. 4(3), Parties are required to communicate their contributions every five 
years.  
86 L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and 
Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 493-514, at 497.  
 
 
self-differentiation87 and procedurally-oriented obligations for implementing the Paris 
Agreement.  
 
The move towards self-differentiation is highly questionable to the extent that it is premised on 
the understanding that the 1992 UNFCCC division between industrialized and developing 
countries is no longer justifiable because the ‘material circumstances have changed, sometimes 
dramatically, in the intervening years and will keep changing in the years ahead’.88  As the Paris 
Agreement is an instrument under the UNFCCC, which enshrines the CBDR principle in Article 
3(1), the Paris Agreement should be interpreted consistently with this and other principles in the 
UNFCCC. However, there is a view that as ‘economic and political realities have evolved’ since 
the negotiation of the UNFCCC in 1992, the CBDR principle should be interpreted flexibly in 
the light of these changing circumstances.89 Despite the significant economic growth of 
‘emerging economies’ such as Mexico, South Korea, Chile, Brazil, China and India, it is 
important not to overstate the extent of these changes as ‘these economies are not in the same 
position as countries whose economies were industrialized much earlier’.90 Moreover, the 
ongoing and extensive challenges of extreme poverty and hunger that continue to affect millions 
of people in so-called leading developing countries like China and India should not be 
underestimated.91 Expecting greater parallelism between states with unequal capacities may 
ultimately frustrate the mitigation aims of the new international climate change agreement.92  
                                                      
87 Brunnee & Streck, n. 8 above, p. 591.  
88 See, e.g., T.D. Stern, ‘The Shape of a New International Climate Agreement’ (2013), available at: 
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/remarks/2013/215720.htm. 
89 Rajamani, n. 7 above, pp. 837-8. 
90 H. Winkler & L. Rajamani, ‘CBDR&RC in a Regime Applicable to All’ (2014) 14(1) Climate Policy, pp. 102-21, 
at 109. 
91 As noted by Winkler and Rajamani in 2014, ‘US citizens’ income ($49,000) is still 13 times that of India, almost 
six times that of China, and more than four times those of ‘average’ Brazilian or South Africans’: ibid., p. 109.  
92 See further Part 4.  
 
 
 
As with mitigation, the Paris Agreement does not substantively differentiate between developed 
and developing countries’ commitments with respect to adaptation, or loss and damage. The 
Agreement characterizes adaptation as a ‘global challenge faced by all’, although the urgent 
needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change are 
acknowledged.93 It establishes a global goal on adaptation of ‘enhancing adaptive capacity, 
strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change’.94 All parties are obliged 
to engage in adaptation planning and implementation of adaptation actions,95 which are again 
obligations with respect to the procedural steps required, rather than the outcomes of these 
measures. Thus, there is no substantive differentiation between the obligations imposed on 
developed and developing states, yet the Agreement does provide for continuous and enhanced 
support for developing countries for the development and implementation of adaptation plans, 
and the preparation of adaptation communications.96  
 
Although industrialized developed countries are predominantly responsible for loss and damage 
due to climate change, Article 8 of the Paris Agreement imposes no specific, binding obligations 
imposed on these countries.97 Rather, the Agreement recognizes the importance of enhancing 
understanding, action and support for addressing loss and damage due to climate change on a 
cooperative and facilitative basis, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism as 
appropriate.98 The parties have agreed that the inclusion of these provisions in the Agreement 
                                                      
93 Paris Agreement, n. 3 above, Art. 7(2). 
94 Ibid., Art. 7(1).  
95 Ibid., Art. 7(9).  
96 Ibid., Art. 7(13). 
97 The imperative ‘shall’ is not used at all in Art. 8 on loss and damage: ibid., at Art. 8. 
98 Ibid., at Art. 8(1) and 8(2).  
 
 
‘does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation’ for loss and damage due to 
climate change.99  In relation to loss and damage, therefore, the absence of binding, quantifiable 
obligations effectively forecloses opportunities for guaranteeing substantive regard for 
developing states’ interests.  
 
Developed states are urged to demonstrate leadership in supporting developing states to meet 
their largely procedurally-oriented implementation commitments through finance, technology 
and capacity-building support. The Agreement obligates developed countries to provide financial 
resources to developing countries,100 and to take the lead in mobilizing and progressively 
increasing funds for climate finance.101 The COP decision accompanying the Paris Agreement 
specifies that a quantified, collective goal for climate finance, scaled-up from a floor of US $100 
billion per year, shall be agreed prior to 2025.102 Prior to this, developed countries intend to 
continue to work toward their existing collective goal of mobilizing US $100 billion per year 
agreed at Cancun in 2010.103 Developed countries are required to submit biennial 
communications indicating quantitative and qualitative information regarding climate finance, 
including the ‘projected level of public financial resources provided to developing country 
parties’.104 These funds will be managed and disbursed by the Financial Mechanism of the 
Convention.105 Moreover, the Agreement provides for financial support for developing countries 
                                                      
99 Draft decision -/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Report of the COP on its Twenty-first Session, held in 
Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, 12 December 2015, at para. 
52. 
100 Paris Agreement, n. 3 above, at Art. 9(1).  
101 Ibid., at Art. 9(3).  
102 Draft decision -/CP.21, n. 99 above, at para. 54. 
103 Ibid.  
104 Paris Agreement, n. 3 above, at Art. 9(5). 
105 Ibid., at Art. 9(8).  
 
 
for technology development and transfer through the Convention’s Technology Mechanism,106 
and urges developed country parties to enhance support for capacity building in developing 
countries107 – the institutional arrangements for capacity building will be decided at the first COP 
serving as the meeting of the parties to the Paris Agreement.108 Thus, developing countries can 
apply for financial, technology and capacity-building support from the relevant institutional body 
serving the Paris Agreement.  
 
The above-mentioned avenues for developing states to apply for assistance provide opportunities 
for country-specific circumstances to be taken into account in decisions about treaty 
implementation, which is prima facie consonant with procedural regard. To maximize 
opportunities for procedural regard, the procedures shaping and constraining these decision-
making processes need to hold states to account for their commitments, be transparent, 
encourage participation by affected state actors, and be accompanied by written reasons and 
review mechanisms.109 The ‘transparency framework for action and support’ specified in Article 
13 of the Paris Agreement goes some way towards achieving this by recognizing the need for 
greater transparency in relation to information on both mitigation action and support, which will 
be subject to technical expert review,110 to build trust and confidence between parties.111 The 
provisions in Article 13 facilitate procedural differentiation by taking into account the national 
capabilities and circumstances of developing country parties in implementing the transparency 
framework.112  
                                                      
106 Ibid., at Art. 10(6). 
107 Ibid., at Art. 11(3).  
108 Ibid., at Art. 11(5).  
109 Stewart, n. 9 above, at pp. 225, 235-6. 
110 Paris Agreement, n. 3 above, Art. 13(11).  
111 Ibid., Art. 13(1) and 13(7). 
112 Ibid., Art. 13(12), 13(14) and 13(15). 
 
 
 
Three key oversight mechanisms provided for in the Paris Agreement are ‘multilateral 
consideration of progress’,113 ‘global stocktakes’114 and non-compliance processes.115 Each party 
is expected to participate in a ‘facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress’ with respect to 
the implementation and achievement of its mitigation contributions and, for developed country 
parties, their efforts with respect to providing financial resources to assist developing 
countries.116 The purpose of the global stocktake held every five years is to ‘assess the collective 
progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long term goals’.117 It is as yet 
unclear how the ‘facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress’ will be conducted, what its 
outcomes will be, and how it will feed into the global stocktake.118 The emphasis on collective 
progress suggests that individual states will not be individually held to account for their 
actions.119 
 
The oversight mechanisms provided for in the Paris Agreement partially contribute to creating a 
procedurally-constrained space for administrative action under the regime, however there is a 
notable lacuna in relation to consequences for failing to comply with obligations, which is an 
important element of accountability.120 Whilst binding procedural requirements are specified in 
the Paris Agreement, there are no prescriptive mitigation, adaptation, or loss and damage targets, 
and there are no quantified and time-bound goals in relation to finance, technology and capacity-
building support. Although the Paris Agreement highlights the need for developed states to assist 
                                                      
113 Ibid., Art. 13(11).   
114 Ibid., Art. 14.  
115 Ibid., Art. 15. 
116 Ibid., Art. 13(11).  
117 Ibid., Art. 14(1). 
118 Rajamani, n. 86 above, p. 503. 
119 Ibid., p. 504.  
120 Stewart, n. 9 above, p. 253. 
 
 
developing, least developed and small island countries, and signals that scaled-up financial 
commitments beyond previous efforts are mandatory,121 the lack of precision in these obligations 
limits the extent to which developed states can be held to account for honouring their 
commitments. As shall be shown in the following Part, soft and vague commitments in relation 
to financial and technology transfer that are not buttressed by strong accountability mechanisms 
are at high risk of ineffectiveness.  
 
Similar issues arise in relation to the compliance mechanism, which will be established to 
provide a forum for facilitating states’ improved performance if states do not comply with 
provisions under the Agreement. The Paris Agreement’s compliance mechanism appears likely 
to operate similarly to the Facilitative Branch under the Kyoto Protocol122 – as previously noted, 
the Enforcement Branch model has not been replicated in this new agreement. The modalities 
and procedures for this mechanism will be adopted by the COP serving as the meeting of the 
parties to the Paris Agreement in 2016.123 However, the Paris Agreement specifies that the 
compliance committee will be ‘expert-based and facilitative in nature’, and is required to ‘pay 
particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties’.124 
Accordingly, the Paris Agreement’s compliance framework appears likely to represent a new 
                                                      
121 Paris Agreement, n. 3 above, Art. 9(1) and 9(3).  Art. 9(1) states that ‘Developed country Parties shall provide 
financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in 
continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention’. Art. 9(3) specifies that ‘As part of a global effort, 
developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of 
sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds through a variety of actions, including 
supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. 
Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts’. These provisions 
should be read in the light of Art. 4(7) of the UNFCCC, which states that ‘The extent to which developing country 
Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective 
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial 
resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and 
poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties’. 
122 Ibid., at Art. 15(1).  
123 Ibid., at Art. 15(3).  
124 Ibid., at Art. 15(2). 
 
 
procedurally-constrained forum for enhancing procedural regard for developing states’ interests 
in regime decision-making processes, without guaranteeing favourable substantive outcomes.  
 
An important aspect of accountability is the imposition of ‘sanctions or other remedies for 
deficient performance’,125 drawing into question the efficacy of a purely ‘facilitative’, ‘non-
adversarial’ and ‘non-punitive’ approach to compliance.126 Apart from public ‘naming and 
shaming’, non-compliant state parties are likely to face limited concrete consequences.127 In the 
absence of intrusive consequences for non-compliance, such as trade suspensions and the 
deprivation of other rights and privileges under the treaty,128 questions can be raised about the 
adequacy of this compliance system to effect significant behavioural changes,129 and thus to 
provide a strong accountability mechanism as part of a robust framework for procedural regard. 
For optimal utility, the nascent opportunities for procedurally-oriented differentiation in the Paris 
Agreement need to be reinforced by a comprehensive suite of administrative mechanisms, 
including consequences for non-compliance, to hold states to account for their mitigation and 
support commitments. 
 
 
                                                      
125 Stewart, n. 9 above, at p. 253. 
126 Paris Agreement, n. 3 above, at Art. 15(2).  
127 S. Oberthur, ‘Options for a Compliance Mechanism in a 2015 Climate Agreement’ (2014) 4 Climate Law, pp. 
30-49, at 43.  
128 The compliance committees under the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal Protocol and CITES have recourse to potential 
sanctions with economic consequences that may apply to parties found to be in non-compliance with their treaty 
obligations: Huggins, n. 21 above, p. 10. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987, 
Montreal (Canada), 16 Sept. 1987, in force 1 Jan. 1989, available at: http://ozone.unep.org/pdfs/Montreal-
Protocol2000.pdf; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 1973, 
Washington D.C. (US), 3 Mar. 1973, in force 1 July 1975, available at:  https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php. 
129 See, e.g., G.W. Downs, D.M. Rocke & P.N. Barsoom, ‘Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation?’ (1996) 50(3) International Organization, pp. 379-406; R. Byrnes & P. Lawrence, ‘Can “Soft Law” 
Solve “Hard Problems”? Justice, Legal Form and the Durban-Mandated Climate Negotiations’ (2015) 34 University 
of Tasmania Law Review, pp. 34-67, at 48. 
 
 
4. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE IMO REGIME FOR REDUCTION OF 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS 
As the Paris Agreement is in its infancy and has not yet legally entered into force, it is too early 
to holistically evaluate the emergent procedurally-oriented framework for differentiation 
between developed and developing countries. This Part turns to the IMO’s regime for the 
reduction of GHG emissions from ships to explore insights and transferable lessons for the Paris 
Agreement. Like the Paris Agreement, the IMO regime emphasizes procedural, rather than 
substantive, avenues for promoting developing countries’ interests. It is argued that, despite 
some important differences between the two regimes, there are lessons for the development of 
the administrative apparatus operationalizing the Paris Agreement that can be learned from the 
IMO’s failure to effectively embed procedural regard through the development of robust 
accountability mechanisms.  
 
The UNFCCC and Paris Agreement share both similarities and differences with the IMO regime. 
The UNFCCC and the IMO have parallel membership – all 171 current members of the IMO130 
have ratified the UNFCCC,131 and there is consensus agreement amongst UNFCCC members on 
the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Protection of the environment falls within the remit of both 
regimes,132 however the IMO’s mandate is significantly broader and encompasses 
responsibilities for setting standards for prevention of pollution and ensuring the safety and 
                                                      
130 IMO, ‘Member States’ (2016), available at: 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/MemberStates.aspx.  
131 UNFCCC, ‘List of Annex I Parties to the Convention’ (2016), available at: 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php, and UNFCCC, ‘List of Non-Annex I Parties 
to the Convention’ (2016), available at: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php. 
132 S. Kopela, ‘Climate Change, Regime Interaction, and the Principle of Common But Differentiated 
Responsibility: The Experience of the International Maritime Organization’ (2014) 24(1) Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law pp. 70-101, at 73. 
 
 
security of international maritime transportation systems.133 The emphasis on the CBDR 
principle in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol contrasts starkly with the IMO’s principles of 
non-discrimination and no more favourable treatment with respect to the universal application of 
adopted measures. This means that, irrespective of the flag or ownership of the ship, IMO 
measures are binding upon all parties.134 The Paris Agreement’s approach to self-differentiated 
mitigation targets bears more similarities to the IMO approach than the Kyoto Protocol’s stance 
on differential treatment. Yet, unlike the IMO, the Paris Agreement does not impose equal 
mitigation targets upon all parties. Thus, despite overlapping memberships and environmental 
protection remits, the approach to differential treatment in the IMO and climate change regimes 
diverges significantly.   
 
The two regimes are strongly linked as Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol obligates developed 
countries to work through the IMO to reduce GHG emissions from shipping.135 According to a 
study conducted by the IMO considering data between 2007 and 2012, the maritime transport 
sector is responsible for more than 3% of annual global CO2 emissions.136 Further, emissions 
from shipping are anticipated to grow by 50% to 250% by 2050.137 Almost 14 years after the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, in 2011 the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 
of the IMO adopted an amendment to Annex VI of the 1973 International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)138, which introduced an Energy Efficiency 
Design Index (EEDI) for new ships and a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) 
                                                      
133 IMO, ‘Introduction to IMO’ (2016), available at: http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx. 
134 Kopela, n. 132 above, p. 78.  
135 Kyoto Protocol, n. 2 above, Art. 2(2). 
136 IMO, Third IMO GHG Study 2014 (2015, IMO), at p. 1. 
137 Ibid, at p. 4.  See also A. Bows-Larkin et al., ‘Shipping Charts a High Carbon Course’ (2015) 5 Nature Climate 
Change, pp. 293-5.  
138 London (UK), 2 Nov. 1973, in force 2 Oct. 1983, available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201340/volume-1340-I-22484-English.pdf. 
 
 
for new and existing ships.139 These technical measures are not, by themselves, sufficient to 
significantly reduce emissions from ships, and the IMO is presently considering further technical 
and market-based measures to achieve this goal.140  
 
As with the negotiations for the Paris Agreement, the appropriate role for the CBDR principle 
has been highly contentious in the IMO negotiations on reducing GHG emissions from the 
maritime sector.141 As noted above, the IMO adheres to the principle of non-discrimination 
between states, and accordingly IMO technical regulations are applicable to ships flying the flag 
of all state parties.142 However, as Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol entrusts the IMO with the 
task of pursuing emissions reduction from marine bunker fuels, some developing countries have 
argued strenuously that the measures adopted by the IMO should be congruent with the 
principles established by the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, especially the CBDR principle to 
‘ensure coherence and consistency with the climate change regime’.143 Despite strong objections 
from some developing countries including Brazil, China, India and Saudi Arabia, IMO member 
states decided to make the EEDI and SEEMP emissions-reduction measures applicable to all 
ships irrespective of their nationality. This is a significant departure from the CBDR principle as 
                                                      
139 M.S. Karim, ‘IMO Mandatory Energy Efficiency Measures for International Shipping: The First Mandatory 
Global Greenhouse Gas Reduction Instrument for an International Industry’ (2011) 7(1) Macquarie Journal of 
International and Comparative Environmental Law, pp. 111-3. 
140 Y. Shi, ‘Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping: Is it Time to Consider Market-based 
Measures?’ (2016) 64 Marine Policy, pp. 123-34; M.S. Karim, Prevention of Pollution of the Marine Environment 
from Vessels: The Potential and Limits of the International Maritime Organisation (Springer, 2015), pp. 107-26.   
141 S.N. Palassis, ‘The IMO’s Climate Change Challenge: Application of the Principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ (2014) 6(1) Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment, pp. 160-95. 
142 M.S. Karim & S. Alam, ‘Climate Change and Reduction of Emissions of Greenhouse Gases from Ships: An 
Appraisal’ (2011) 1(1) Asian Journal of International Law, pp. 131-48.  
143 Kopela, n. 132 above, p. 78. 
 
 
reflected in the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.144  
 
The understanding ultimately reached in the IMO negotiations was that the CBDR principle 
would be implemented through procedural mechanisms to support implementation rather than 
through imposing differentiated substantive obligations.145 Accordingly, regulation 23(1) of the 
amended MARPOL Annex VI provides that: ‘Administrations shall, in co-operation with the 
Organization and other international bodies, promote and provide, as appropriate, support 
directly or through the Organization to States, especially developing States, that request technical 
assistance’.146 This regulation does not impose a direct obligation for transfer of technology and 
assistance from developed to developing states, but rather creates a framework whereby 
developing states may request such assistance. Developing states’ requests for technology and 
funding assistance in order to facilitate compliance with new technical and operational guidelines 
are taken into account in the administration of the regime, which prima facie provides an 
opportunity for procedural regard.  
 
Despite this potential, this approach has led to a deadlock in the IMO negotiations due to 
developed countries’ non-cooperation in providing funds and transfer of technology to 
developing states.147 After the adoption of the 2011 amendment to MARPOL, developing 
countries expressed their reservations about further negotiations for market-based measures until 
a consensus and proper arrangements for technical assistance for implementation of existing 
                                                      
144 Y. Shi, ‘The Challenge of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Shipping: Assessing the 
International Maritime Organization’s Regulatory Response’ (2012) 23(1) Yearbook of International Environmental 
Law, pp. 131-67. 
145 Karim, n. 140 above. 
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measures were evident.148 After fraught debates, state parties finally agreed to adopt a resolution 
on the promotion of technical cooperation and transfer of technology in 2013.149 However, this 
new resolution does not establish a legally binding arrangement in which developed countries are 
obliged to provide financial and technical assistance in return for developing countries’ 
acceptance of similar substantive climate change mitigation commitments.150  
 
Thus, in the IMO’s climate change regime, developed countries have shown reluctance to frame 
and implement an adequate system to support developing countries to achieve their equal 
mitigation obligations. The 2013 resolution on technical assistance was adopted only after some 
leading developing countries took the position that no further discussion on market-based or 
additional technical measures for mitigation would continue without a resolution on technical 
assistance and technology transfer to support existing measures. Despite these efforts, the IMO 
resolution on technical assistance in fact failed to materially change the previous ineffective 
arrangements. The resolution urges or requests the member states that are able to provide 
technical assistance, yet the non-mandatory technology transfer commitments contain many 
caveats. These qualifications include that the transfer of technology ‘needs to respect property 
rights, including intellectual property rights, and to be on mutually agreed terms and 
conditions’,151 and is subject to national laws, regulations and policies of the country providing 
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assistance.152 The end result is that both developing and developed countries have the same 
substantive mitigation obligations, but the administrative apparatus for the implementation of the 
CBDR principle is being undermined by unsatisfactory levels of financial and technical 
assistance provided by developed states.  
 
Inadequate accountability mechanisms appear to have contributed to the failure of the IMO’s 
procedurally-differentiated processes. During the negotiations regarding the 2013 resolution on 
technical assistance, the developing countries of Angola, China, Jamaica, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Venezuela stated that ‘the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their 
commitments on transfer of technology is inherently linked to the extent to which developing 
country Parties are required to implement their own commitments’, and stressed the need for the 
creation of a clear accountability framework with a robust reporting and evaluation procedure for 
facilitating technology transfer and assistance.153 Similarly, India raised serious concerns that the 
2013 resolution would not be successful without an effective mechanism for monitoring of 
implementation:  
we are still apprehensive of the extent to which the spirit of this resolution is going to be 
transformed to reality. Hence, India strongly requests the Organization to put in place effective 
mechanisms to continuously assess and monitor the effectiveness of implementation of this 
resolution, so that the support materially reaches the entitled developing nations.154 
 
These developing country perspectives indicate a view that the implementation challenges 
associated with both the 2011 amendment to MARPOL and the 2013 resolution on technical 
assistance are attributable to a dearth of effective accountability mechanisms. Conceptually, this 
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point is reinforced by Stewart’s argument regarding the importance of accountability as a key 
regard-enhancing mechanism.155 Thus, both developing country perspectives expressed during 
the IMO negotiations and the elements of procedural regard support the desirability of robust 
accountability arrangements.  
 
In developing the implementation and compliance framework for the Paris Agreement, much can 
be learned from the IMO experience regarding the importance of strong mechanisms for holding 
developed states to account for their support obligations, which will significantly bolster 
emerging opportunities for procedural regard. This is significant as in the current absence of 
precise, binding commitments, the implementation of the general obligations for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation imposed upon all state parties under the Paris Agreement primarily 
relies upon developed states’ goodwill in providing financial, technical and capacity-building 
support to developing states. The provisions relating to the enhanced transparency framework for 
action and support discussed in Part 3 go some way toward providing mechanisms to promote 
implementation of developed states’ financial and technical assistance commitments, in addition 
to all parties’ mitigation commitments. In the light of the foregoing analysis, serious questions 
arise as to whether a framework predicated on transparency, expert review, collective oversight 
and facilitative non-compliance processes will be sufficiently robust to achieve the Agreement’s 
mitigation and support aims in the absence of strong consequences for states’ non-compliance 
with their commitments.   
 
The stakes of failure are significantly higher in the Paris Agreement than the IMO’s climate 
change regime. In the latter regime, the reluctance of developed countries to provide financial 
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and technical assistance to developing states after achieving their goal of common mitigation 
obligations has not had a direct deleterious impact on the global economy. This is because the 
IMO’s technical and operational measures are relatively modest and do not increase the cost of 
operation of ships exponentially as EEDI and SEEMP also create energy-saving opportunities.156 
However, the context of the Paris Agreement differs markedly. The substantive mitigation 
obligations shared by all countries are likely to significantly impact economic progress and 
sustainable development in developing countries in particular due to their existing capacity 
constraints. If developed countries do not fulfil their finance, technology transfer and capacity-
building commitments in good faith, this will have far-reaching negative consequences for 
developing countries and lead to widespread non-compliance, as has been evident in the IMO.157 
Moreover, in addition to mitigation, the Paris Agreement is dealing with important issues of 
adaptation and loss and damage, which also require support from developed countries. 
Accordingly, the IMO’s experience stemming from inadequate accountability mechanisms for 
developed states’ financial and technical assistance commitments provides a valuable cautionary 
tale for the development of the administrative apparatus for the Paris Agreement. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The Paris Agreement is a symbol of the evolving influence of the CBDR principle in 
international environmental legal instruments. In particular, it exemplifies the increasing scope 
for this principle to shape procedurally-oriented mechanisms for facilitating support for 
developing countries’ implementation of their substantive obligations. In relation to both 
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mitigation action and support, the Paris Agreement evidences latent, but as yet unrealized, 
potential for developing a comprehensive framework for procedural regard. As the IMO 
experience highlights, the emergence of a proceduralized framework for taking into account 
developing states’ interests in the administration of the regime creates a high risk of non-
implementation of climate change mitigation obligations if there is a lack of financial, technical 
and capacity-building support for these states. Thus, in order to prevent a hastened demise of the 
utility of the CBDR principle in the international climate change regime, procedural avenues for 
implementation support for developing countries need to be reinforced by strong accountability 
mechanisms for all states’ mitigation commitments, and developed states’ support commitments. 
In this way, the potential for the proceduralization of differential treatment to develop into a 
robust framework for procedural regard for developing states’ interests may be realized.  
